Skip navigation
0

Ultimate Loyalty

Posted by RichardOwen Jun 22, 2010

Some customers never switch brands. Regardless of how badly let down they are, how poor the performance of the organization and even, in some instances, with a deep personal dislike, bordering on hatred, for the employees and management. They may reduce their consumption, but switch to a competitor? Impossible!

 

I’m referring to football (soccer) fans.England_football.jpg

 

 

Let’s leave The World Cup aside for a moment (although clearly my muse today). National pride and identity is so closely tied into this event that you can’t abandon your brand without abandoning your country – that’s a pretty significant switching cost. Like it or not – and they don’t right now – the citizens of France are tied to their national team. So instead, let’s talk about club level sport.

 

Clearly, brand performance is not necessarily the basis for brand selection or loyalty. You wouldn’t follow Leeds United down the tables, or become a lifelong Chicago Cubs fan if superior performance of your brand was the entire basis for choice. Assuming that we get more utility from our brand winning, rather than losing, we should all behave more like those sport watchers who just woke up one morning and decided to support The Lakers, or Chelsea. But in most instances we don’t. We have huge switching costs, based on a sense of loyalty to the brand that surpasses all elements of brand performance.

 

Growing up in Liverpool, I wasn’t presented with a choice as to which team to support. I was told, earlier than I remember that I was a Liverpool supporter. As it happened, Liverpool was doing quite well at the time (now I’m showing my age) but that wasn’t the point. I was expected to be loyal forever, win lose or draw. This was my brand, my team.

 

Is there anything we can learn from this? Clearly I’m at risk of stretching beyond all logic a topical item if we try and figure out the underlying meaning of NPS from the behavior of sports fans. However, it does remind me of things we know about brand behavior. First, group behavior matters, we want to be part of a crowd. If everyone around you supports a team (which, with teams tied to geography, frequently happens) your affinity for the brand provides you with a sense of group benefits. If, like you, all your friends love their iphone, that gives you group benefits. If everyone has positive word of mouth, so much the better, but being outside the crowd is lonely even if you feel you have a superior product based on your own experience. Ask Zune fans.

 

And loyalty is clearly a human emotion. We are not entirely rational in our choice of brands. Logic is not the only basis of loyalty, we are human after all. Our brand memory of better days may well prompt loyalty well beyond the point where performance has long fallen off.

 

So, back to the TV to see if England can win The World Cup. In this instance, my positive brand memory is in black-and-white, and I hadn’t learned to walk, that’s how long ago it was.

0

Obviously not, or we wouldn't be asking...

 

The MIT Sloan Management Review poses this question and at first glance you would assume that this is a leading question. After all, “yes” makes for a short article.

 

However, the question raised reminds us of the reasons that most companies employ Net Promoter and why it creates change. Let’s start with the five questions posed by the article:

 

  1. Can middle managers accurately describe your customer promise?
  2. Can all members of your senior executive team name the three things that most undermine trust among your existing customers?
  3. Is your brand really the best option for customers? Will it continue to be next month and next year?
  4. Have you embraced any novel ideas that have produced significant innovations beyond the
    familiar during the past year?
  5. Have front-line staff posed any uncomfortable questions or suggested any important improvements to your offering during the last three months?

 

Net Promoter is not a silver bullet to address these issues, but it does take a step forward towards several of them. For example, if a classic failing of companies is the inability of senior management to identify the top three things that undermine trust, you would expect any decent NPS root cause review with senior management to call out those three items. In terms of brand fit, the more interesting question relies on a segmentation model: for which of our customers IS our brand the best option and for which group ISN’T it? As you segment your NPS by behavioral or other segmentation criteria, again, the relative NPS between segments should be a strong lead as to where your brand is the best option.


But the question around front line staff is clearly where Net Promoter shines. Anecdotal voice of the customer information and closed loop processes serve to both engage the front line (they are part of coming up with solution and hence “important improvements”) and act as “aircover” for taking customer issues up the organizational chain.


So Net Promoter, through engagement with both senior management and front line employees, works hard to address the two information gaps that characterize the idea behind the information failure that’s at the heart of the article. A timely reminder of the right focus of your program.

2

In a recent HBR blog, McKinsey consultants Magni and Atsmon point out that in China, to paraphrase the famous maxim on politics, all word of mouth is local. They further suggest that word of mouth is a more powerful force for Chinese consumers than for their equivalent in the US or UK.

 

As Net Promoter Score is essentially a word of mouth measure, this intrigued us. Would NPS be more powerful in China than the west?

 

We know that there are cross cultural differences in NPS – we (Satmetrix) publish benchmarking if that’s important to you – but this question goes further, suggesting a higher correlation between NPS and growth in the middle kingdom.

 

I’d suggest the jury is still out on this one. As nations modernize, consumers tend to build higher levels of trust in brands which has the effect of reducing their reliance on word of mouth. If I show up in a new city, I don’t ask locals if the Starbucks is any good in Dallas, I just assume that the brand carries their promise. It is only when brand proliferation and choice saturates the marketplace that people refocus their efforts on recommendation.

 

Or at least that’s the theory. Maybe a society being thrust rapidly into 21st century consumerism with it’s local, social infrastructure still intact will never unlearn the practice of reliance of word of mouth over word of advertising.

1

Dave Rich makes the point in a Forbes article that loyalty to firms is declining, based on the commentary around Accenture’s 2009 Global Customer Satisfaction Survey. Without knowing all the details around the survey – who was asked, what products or services they purchased, etc.– it’s hard to support or deny these claims. But on the surface, it raises some interesting points.

 

Rich points to the fact that 69% of respondents have switched on one service or another over the last year. Let’s take that at face value and assume that this really is a change (I don’t know if it was up on prior years) or at least is relatively significant. What are the underlying factors that might have contributed to such a move?

 

The biggest two drivers of customers changing products, brands or services are informational barriers and switching costs. If customers don’t know about superior alternatives, they can’t choose them; if the switching costs are higher than the benefits, they won’t switch even if they might like to.

 

We have seen a massive change in the nature of informational barriers over the last decade as the Internet removed the last available fig leaf for businesses to avoid comparison, and social networking provoked peer-to-peer product comparisons. Even if – as I suspect – social networking is currently overstated in its impact on word of mouth (loud, but not accurate), the trend is pretty clear.

 

As informational barriers fall, competition increases and brand loyalty is threatened. After all, anyone making a profit is (theoretically) a signal to attack their markets. What about switching costs? Again, competition forces the reduction of these costs over time – it’s hard to lock customers in if your competitors are advertising lower switching costs and your customers are well informed of their choices.

Accenture’s observations should not come as a great surprise. The bad news is, it won’t be as easy to hold on to your customers. The good news is that it’s easier to grab your competitors if you are an NPS leader.

0

Not Just a Flash in the Pan

Posted by RichardOwen Apr 30, 2010

Let’s say you have the absolutely best product on the market. You out-innovate your competitors and have dominant market share. Things are pretty good: your customers love you, you have the best Net Promoter Score in the industry and you are making amazing profits.

 

Competition ensues. Extraordinary profits are a signal to the capitalist economy; picture the scene in “Finding Nemo” where the seagulls all start shouting “Mine!” The profit pool is deep, come dive in the water is lovely. Sooner or later, the profit pool gets eroded; either someone out-innovates you or the availability of close substitutes reduces prices and profits. It’s hard to keep the party going.

 

Unless.

 

Switching costs are the enterprise’s solution to the long term seeming inevitability of eroded profitability. If you can create significant costs for your customers to defect, you delay the inevitable. It’s the fountain of youth for corporate profits. Wireless contracts, pharma patents, up-front capital expenses – all great switching cost strategies that defend profits beyond their sell-by date. All legal, and all smart business practice.

 

From a customer perspective, the benefits are less clear. Companies that enjoy significant switching costs typically also demonstrate lower Net Promoter Scores. Of course! You now have reduced incentives to innovate and take care of your customers. Comparative NPS rules the outcome and all of a sudden you have a leg up when it comes to customers making a real comparison. I may not like my current provider as much as new entrants, but with the hassle and costs of switching they may keep my business.

 

Although it’s not part of a plan, companies with higher switching costs almost inevitably end up with lower NPS, and firms who are subject to brutal competition are more likely to fight to raise their scores (or just concede market share). And all companies are trying to create switching costs.

 

The Apple/Adobe spat in the news is, at one level, a simple business conflict. Adobe benefits from standardized tools that run their popular flash technology on all kinds of devices. Apple benefits from creating differentiation around those devices. These two perspectives inevitably lead to competition. The question is, how does this game play out for their customers?

 

A lot hangs on Apple’s ability to execute their strategy of being best when they go it alone. Nobody else in the industry has been quite as  good,  quite as innovative, at creating products that allow their customers to remain loyal despite switching costs. Once you have your itunes library, your iphone, your Mac, your switching costs are significant but your vendor has not, yet, exploited them – to the contrary, they have rewarded your loyalty with innovation. But the conflict with Adobe seems to take this strategy to the next level. Developers are being told to choose sides – which they hate to do – and Apple customers may face less choices and higher switching costs as a result.

 

Apple will be successful in creating switching costs, they have done so for some time. They are comfortable going it alone. But the pressure will only get more significant if competitors can create promoters using popular technologies such as flash. The table stakes just shot up.

 

Read also Josh Bernoff’s take on this at Advertising Age. Or, for an alternative, a view I don’t subscribe to from Simon Dumenco in the same publication.

3

It was inevitable, I suppose. Spirit Air steps up to the plate with a fee for carry-on baggage leaving passengers no doubt arbitraging between check-in and carry-on bag rates. Weighted, of course, by the probability of enforcement, or your ability to persuade the flight crew that the refrigerator box with a gaffer-taped handle and fake “Tumi” logo will, in fact, fit in the overhead bin. In England, your “bin” means your trash can, which seems very fitting.

 

Anything you can do, Ryanair can do better. Time to look at charging for using the loo, it turns out. I’m not sure if it’s the money or the symbolism for Ryanair; I sort of imagine a group of execs sitting around brainstorming new cost saving ideas and coming up with that one. “The PR value of the announcement is worth more than the cost of implementation” would seem like a good argument, from the school of PR that suggests any time they can spell your name correctly is good PR….

 

Our instant reaction is horror. What a recipe for Detractors. If Richard Branson seems to be the epitome of an airline executive who practices an NPS mindset, Michael O’Leary, the highly quotable CEO of Ryanair is his mirror; playing Darth Vader to Branson’s Skywalker. And yes, I know those two ended up on the same side.

 

O’Leary seems to covet the role of villain. If you ran a root cause analysis on Detractors at Ryanair (I’m not necessarily going out on a limb by suggesting they might not do this), their strict no-refund policy would show up as a key driver. Addressing his #1 complaint, O’Leary framed this closed loop response this way: “… say my granny fell ill. What part of no refund don’t you understand?”

 

So that’s conclusive, book closed. We, the judge jury and executioner of performance in NPS land can confidently predict that they are out of business. And we should assume Spirit Air is going the same way, after all, they seem to be following the same logic.

 

Except that it works for Ryanair, and it might just work for Spirit. Works? It works spectacularly. Ryanair market capitalization exceeds that of BA, Lufthansa and Air France (although admittedly, that’s not a strong industry group for shareprice and profits have been beaten down recently). So NPS must not work. Ryanair MUST have low NPS and yet they are winning.

 

Perhaps it’s the exception that proves the rule?

 

Possibly, but you can build a plausible argument that both Ryanair and Spirit are right in their choices. The governing factor of course is price – providing the ultimate context for NPS.

 

Here’s how it works. NPS is measured by individuals in the context of expectations; we have a notion of what we expect based on marketing and prior experience with products and services. This is not the same as what we want. I want my cable guy to show up 10 minutes after the my request to fix my service; I expect him to show up on a scheduled date as promised. Actually, for my cable guy I expect him to randomly arrive exactly when I’m not available … but I digress. What we expect is the context in which NPS gets formed.

 

And we know that expectations get shifted by many factors – but price is the biggie. Shift the price, shift the expectations - after all, it’s the only numeric comparative component we have for products and services. Ryanair and Spirit are embarking on a strategy to reduce price so dramatically that their expectations are rock bottom. In this instance it might be “Ryanair will phyically move me to my destination safely, at some time during a given 24 hour period”. These expectations may be elegantly aligned with a $5 airfare. Against that expectation – bingo – Ryainair exceeds and creates Promoters.

 

Baggage policies on the surface however, look like bad profits. However, that’s only in the context of prior industry expectations. There is no logical business reason that you should have a bundled baggage allowance; I say bundled, not free, as you are paying for it somewhere in the ticket price. The reason it’s a change at all is simply because airlines traditionally – in an era of much less competitive prices and costs – bundled a lot of services (including use of the toilet). Our expectations have been formed on that traditional industry model, not for any inherently logical reason but just because of tradition. In fact, you could make the argument that it makes more sense to charge for carry on bags, as you are simply segmenting your customer base and providing a discount for customers who don’t use that facility! In fact, many of Spirit’s customers wrote in to favorably make exactly that point…. activated Promoters in action?

 

The bad profits argument can be overplayed. Just about any type of fee or charge could be considered bad profits, yet logically there is no reason we should penalize one particular pricing mechanism – unbundling in this case – from another. Rather, I would suggest we gauge bad profits against the measure of transparency and expectation. On both counts, you could build a case that Ryanair is in good shape. You could argue their website is one constant upsell game, but where is the crime there? On the contrary, you could argue that Ryanair comes closer to transparency in their brand promise than full service airlines that advertise the opportunity to fly in a state of nirvana as you are pampered by exemplary service.

 

Many companies understand that the best way to create an army of Promoters is to change expectations in an industry. Usually that’s upwards – through creation of a breakthrough product or service. In the airline industry, it just might be downwards through expectation reduction and low fares.

 

As O’Leary puts it: “The European consumer would crawl naked over broken glass to get low fares.” Sounds like low expectations of service that perhaps even Ryanair can deliver on.

0

A Bronze for NBC

Posted by RichardOwen Feb 22, 2010

I’m really enjoying the Olympics. I’m not entirely sure why, I’m a hopeless skier and generally not what you would call an athlete, so I certainly can’t identify with the folks who take part. Maybe it’s because, as I get older, I start to appreciate just how dangerous these sports are. Freed of the invulnerability that youth confers, I’m finally sensitized to the danger of these sports. For most of the summer Olympic sports, sure, you could sprain an ankle. This year, for obvious reasons, we have a heightened awareness of the danger of sliding down snow and ice at speeds of 90mph.

 

And with that sensitivity comes admiration and awe.

 

Which I don’t share for the television coverage.

 

It’s not that I don’t enjoy the actual TV show here in the US. Bob, Al, Chris etc… enjoyable commentary, superior angles of coverage… it’s all good. No, my issue is TAPE DELAY as an instructive lesson in how you tax your customers and damage your long term business.

 

First, it’s painfully in-your-face obvious, here on the west coast, that there is tape delay. It can’t be pitch black in San Francisco and sunny in Vancouver.

 

Second, we expect live sports to be live. And it’s ridiculous to ask us to “avoid” the results. Heck the Wall Street Journal – yes, the Journal – carried the live news of the US/Canada hockey game last night right there on its home page. I couldn’t open up the website of a business newspaper without seeing the result. So, even on a Sunday, there is no longer the suspense of live TV.

 

We know why they are doing it. Moving coverage to “prime time” which is, inconveniently, not the time that the sporting events occur, helps sell advertising. Except that it has the completely opposite effect in the long run – converting people to the real existential threat for advertising paid television – TIVO. If I can’t watch it live, I might as well TIVO it, so I can skip the commercials. And now I’m mad that I didn’t get the chance to enjoy the suspense of seeing if Bodie could actually win the gold on the slalom leg.

I’m a promoter of the Olympics, a detractor of the network strategy and bearish on the long term business model that drives customers away from live sports – the only remaining defensible segment of the advertising driven television market.

2

There is a tendency in most companies to rush to set NPS targets and goals. This usually comes from a very good place. Leaders want to emphasize that customer loyalty is important - I agree, of course - and including it in goals is the signal that most organizations use to let employees know something is important.

 

The challenge comes, however, when you connect NPS to compensation before your program (and your data) has reached an appropriate level of maturity.

 

Target setting is appropriate only when you feel you have trustworthy data. I come back to this issue of trustworthy data a lot, because it is so critical and so often overlooked. If you don’t feel your data is accurate, reliable, and representative of your customer base, then it is very difficult to argue that you will have confidence in setting targets around the Net Promoter Score, or related feedback. For many organizations, making their CRM systems and customer databases accurate, and obtaining feedback from the right customers can take at least 6 months—often longer.

 

Let’s assume you’ve crossed that first chasm of trustworthy data. Then how do you approach the challenge of setting appropriate targets?

 

Below are some approaches that we have used at Satmetrix. Ultimately, the path each company chooses is dependent on the organization’s philosophy about target setting in general. The list below is by no means exhaustive, but it’s a good place to start.

 

Set targets based on improvement goals.

In its most basic implementation, some companies require every group to improve by a similar number of points on the Net Promoter scale -for example a 3 point improvement. Although this seems like an appropriate mechanism there are a couple of challenges with this methodology.

 

First of all, individual business units, stores, or functions that start with low scores will generally improve more than those at the top of the range. A good solution is to ask the top performers to maintain or improve on the margin, while setting more aggressive goals for the bottom scoring units. For example, a businesses with a negative 40 Net Promoter Score might reasonably expect to see a 10 point improvement in a year’s time with appropriate actions are taken, while a businesses with a 70 NPS might only expect a 2 to 3 point improvement.

 

Secondly, if you operate in multiple countries, you will need to consider cultural differences in how customers use numeric rating scales such as the 0 to 10 scale that is the basis of Net Promoter. If you treat all countries and geographies equally, you will be penalizing countries in which we generally see lower averages and ranges for NPS. My group has published reports on this topic that show the ranges for about 40 countries around the world where most global companies do the majority of their business. By comparing with that type of data, you can determine whether, in fact, your country and regional scores are meeting expectations or not relative to cultural norms in each market. If you can get direct competitive benchmarks in each country, even better. But this data gives you a way to level the playing field across many key geographies.

 

Set targets based on historical performance.

While this also seems like an appropriate mechanism, you can imagine scenarios (not uncommon) where the score is declining. Unlikely that you will want to use the "trend" function in excel to set targets when performance is declining.

 

In this case you have several options - you can set the target at the highest score the company or unit has previously achieved, or set goals to move back to that level using a rolling average of some sort.  Either way the message you are sending is that scores must improve.

 

Set targets based on statistically significant improvement.

Although I am a fan of using statistics, as it takes some of the debate out of setting targets, this approach should not be used in a vacuum. We typically apply multiple mechanisms to get to the right targets – start with some reasonable growth goal, ensure it is statistically different from last year’s performance, and consider things like cultural influences.

 

Set targets on improvement or movement in the Net Promoter categories or "buckets".

For example, depending on the distribution of your Promoters, Passives and Detractors, you might consider moving X% of Passives to Promoters, or consider eliminating Detractors (or nearly so). Why I focus on the distribution is that some lucky companies with 2% Detractors would waste time and money trying to solve the Detractor problems, vs. moving your Passives to have more Promoters.

 

Set targets based on the key drivers of Net Promoter.

With this approach,  you are focusing the organization on the "levers" to pull, and key operational actions and KPIs that will ultimately improve the Net Promoter Score, instead of focusing everyone on the score itself.  For some employees, this approach has the advantage of creating specific goals they feel closer to - and can more easily control, such as improving their responsiveness, or thinking of ways to make their organization easier to do business with.

 

These are just a few techniques we have used. I think you can see that setting the right goals is not a "one size fits all" proposition. But when you have trustworthy data and can connect NPS goals to the core business strategy, the customer’s voice can serve as your company’s ultimate rallying cry.

0

Road tax for NPS?

Posted by RichardOwen Oct 6, 2009

What’s in the water in Detroit these days? First you see GM teaming up with eBay – a deal that has the potential to finally shake up the buyer experience in the auto industry, and now they are talking about "money back guarantees". They must be crazy.

 

It’s logical that a "near brush with death", like GM’s bankruptcy, should create an unfreezing of business practices. Yet somehow, many people never quite expected even this kind of disruption to force change in the industry. What GM is doing, if it succeeds, is re-writing the rules for the automobile industry and they, as the company with nothing to lose, is in the perfect position to do so.

 

So what do you do if you believe you have a competitive product, but a legacy problem with detractors? Word of mouth is negative, net promoter scores low, and the competition has built a considerable advantage over the years playing the game by the old set of rules.

 

Obviously, we would recommend building an “army of promoters” as a long term strategy for growth, but what if you don’t have until "the long term?" Answer: change the rules by which your competitors won the previous round. Provide an insurance policy that encourages trial and, assuming trial is successful; you have a potential mitigating strategy for your brand shortcomings. Clever.

 

Of course, look at this from another angle. A guarantee costs money, even if just a small percentage of buyers take GM up on their offer. And that cost can be viewed as a cost of brand weakness, a tax on a low NPS. It may turn out that as other companies consider matching the offer, post sales costs become another source of competitive cost advantage for NPS leaders. I would suspect it’s already the case to some degree.

 

In the meantime, those costs make good sense for GM, as does turning the buying experience on its head using eBay. You never know, the next big disruptive move might be to change the notion of customer loyalty and how it is measured.

1

So GM wants to avoid becoming the next Circuit City, insofar as not being wiped out by the online sales experience. Dodge the bullet (excuse the pun) of massive layoffs, shareholder wipeout and supply chain trauma. Might be a little late for that perhaps? Well, necessity is the mother of invention, and GM’s decision to partner with eBay to sell new cars has the potential to be a seismic change in the automotive customer experience.

 

As we have written before, online sales channels have considerable experience advantages over that of bricks and mortar operations. Based on our most recent benchmarks with US consumers (taken, mind you, in December last year in the midst of the economic meltdown), even average performers in online shopping garner NPS® of about 50%, while top-scoring companies achieved scores of 70% or higher. The National Retail Federation rates Zappos, Amazon and Overstock as three of the top four retail experiences (LL Bean keeps physical retail of any kind in the top 4) and yes, we know that the top 3 will be the top 2 very soon. Their advantage springs from several sources. Supply chain efficiencies drive better fulfillment performance at lower inventory levels (the law of large numbers apply). Better data about their customer’s behavior enable them to customize offerings and merchandize more effectively. Oh, and considerably less dependence on "the carbon element" – people, although Zappos has turned that into an asset.

 

Nothing new to report here. However, the automotive industry had always faced the dilemma of channel conflict. Their customer experience, to a very significant degree, lay in the hands of their channel – the dealers – and their channel was pretty resistant to focusing on customer experience. It didn’t help that JD Powers had built a lock on the industry notion of customer satisfaction which, although a terrific marketing tool, didn’t always line up operational dealer excellence with measured outcomes. Oh, and dealer satisfaction measurements have been the "poster child" for gaming results.

 

So why not do away with them altogether? Early online efforts around car sales were clearly a compromise. Last year, I was scouting dealers for a new car purchase, without much pricing relief here in the Bay Area (what a difference a year makes). I tried getting a quote from Yahoo Cars, only to find I was referred to – guess who – the same local dealers with the same local prices and inventory. Why couldn't I get a quote from other dealers? Not going to happen, this was a system constructed to preserve a local monopoly. Problem was, sooner or later I found an online service that brokered a better deal with a dealer in LA – who promptly shipped the car right up to my door.

 

GM’s experiment with EBay leads in only one of two directions. Either the design of the program continues to protect dealers from regional or national competition, in which case people won’t bother to use it, or they will finally open up the door to a national or regional marketplace. If they do – and I hope they do -  the consequences will be profound for the industry. If I can easily get a quote from a dealer in Denver, and shipping costs remain reasonable, it’s possible that premiums in distribution will pretty much evaporate for dealers nationally. This is likely to drive consolidation and efficiency, and a superior customer experience. An easy purchase experience, with a competitive price will improve everyone’s dealer experience, but the dealers will transform into service centers which do need local presence (and are not a bad business to boot). Other brands are likely to follow or face market share loss, assuming other factors (making cars people want to buy) are neutralized.

 

What about test drives? Clearly autos are product that rarely get purchased “sight unseen” (although in parts of Europe that’s sometimes the case). Firms like GM will need some form of showroom to display their product, but won’t need the expensive immediacy of inventory that bogs down their supply chain. Of course, none of this happens overnight, many car buyers will take time to transition their buying habits. But once the genie is out of the bottle, as bookstores discovered, the outcome has inevitability about it. Better customer experience combined with superior economics win out in the end.

 

Will GM win this race? Distribution experience is not the only factor, by a long way, in purchasing your car. Nevertheless, when you have little to lose, reinventing the customer experience could prove the most cost effective of the transformative initiatives the company has to take on to thrive in the long run.

 

How can eBay put you into a GM next week?

1

If the market doesn’t punish you for bad profits, Uncle Sam might.

 

Wall Street is scrambling to understand the financial implications of the Obama administrations new policies towards credit card companies. Reading the definition of revenue sources that will be restricted in the future, it reads awfully like a list of classic bad profits. According to the Wall Street Journal (subscription required), the credit card companies most affected are those who rely on “… portfolios that are skewed toward late-payment fees, over-limit fees and penalty repricing”. Yup. Sounds like bad profits to me. Sounds like they are getting what was coming to them.

 

But hold on.

 

If this practice was so bad, why did the market not simply take care of the issue? The argument for government involvement is usually around market failure; why did the armies of detractors of these credit card companies not bring them to their knees? Faced with such disaster, wouldn’t the executive leadership eliminate this scourge of their business?

 

From our studies in the credit card space, we do know that these practices create detractors, churn and low profits. One plausible explanation of the industry failure to self-address, is the absence of players who have chosen to capitalize on an alternative competitive strategy. In the airline industry, one airline charges for bags and another instantly responds with advertising that it is “bag charge free”. This has not happened to the same degree with credit cards (although I would welcome examples to the contrary). It’s plausible that the segment of customers who are being hit with these bad profits are either so unattractive that the high NPS players don’t want them, or they self select bad profit providers through lack of financial understanding (hence the argument for regulation around opaque rules by the issuer).

 

At a more macro level, the response to Blockbuster Video’s “late fees” was the creation of Netflix. If existing competitors don’t want to eliminate bad profits, sooner or later new entrants will. It would be ironic if the US government’s efforts to eliminate bad profits simply displaced new entrants into the market.

0

The Onion satirizes Apple.

 

OK, it's funny (and not true, of course).  But, at the risk of not just letting good humor stands without interpretation, there is a lesson for marketers.

 

If you are a loyalty leader, you get license from the market. Your mistakes are forgiven. A bad service experience is considered by customers to be a fluke – just bad luck. Even a poorly conceived product is assumed to be a work of genius. We know that high NPS companies don’t just enjoy more people who are willing to recommend. We know that they also have a greater proportion who are likely to recommend – a virtuous circle of word of mouth. The assumption is that you are good at what you do.

 

The flip side is tough work. Low NPS brands have to work harder, build better products and deliver superior services in order to compete. They need to overcome a deficit in positive word of mouth. Customers tend to believe that a positive experience was a fluke – they don’t always reward good service that you might actually deliver. It’s a vicious circle – the assumption is that you aren’t good at what you do.

 

Trends are hard to change in either direction. The solution? Never let yourself get out of “NPS Position” in your industry hierarchy. Fall outside the leadership circle for any period of time and it’s a lot harder to climb back in.

0

You may have missed it, but advertising just died. At least, some very credible sources have pronounced the industry dead. And this, as you can imagine, has a lot of people upset.

 

It's no surprise that in a recession companies are cutting their ad budgets. It's a variable cost so easy to target quickly. If your growth plans just flat-lined (flat IS the new up) then your marketing communication budgets just went the same way. But that's business as usual. The real news is the argument that this is more than just a cyclical change in the business, this is an existential issue. According to some, advertising just doesn't work anymore.

 

It's widely accepted that advertising is changing format. Internet and search advertising has been eating away at more traditional media for some time. Newspapers are essentially (and practically) going out of business - witness the Hearst group shutting down the Seattle Post-Intelligencer or the Sun-Times Media group filing for bankruptcy. Bob Garfield from Advertising Age (hardly a magazine with no stake in the current model) makes a strong argument for the transformation of the industry.

 

The conclusions he draws:

 

Newspapers: dead
Magazines: dead

 

Chicken Little, don your hardhat. Nudged by recession, doom has arrived

 

Even if Bob does a great job articulating the transformation it's not off the scale on the controversy-o-meter. You could almost argue that this view of transformation has become conventional wisdom. But this month, there were worse prognostications to come.

 

Prof. Eric Clemons from Wharton really put the cat amongst the pigeons when he made the case for extinction, not transformation.


“The problem is not the medium, the problem is the message, and the fact that it is not trusted, not wanted, and not needed,”

 

Basically, Eric makes the argument that arguing that this is a transformation in delivery is not the point. The point is that nobody wants the package, and nobody is paying attention any more. Of course, this change doesn't happen overnight. Amazon took years to kill the retail book industry; online sales didn't polish off Circuit City for a decade. But once the change is set in motion, there isn't a lot anyone can do to stop it. Inertia in business, entrenched skills and practices all contribute to change being slower than pure business logic might dictate but this is a bandwagon that is gathering steam. The Economist piles on:


“…every business needs revenues—and advertising, it transpires, is not going to provide enough”


in reference to the new dot-com businesses hoping to monetize eyeballs for riches. Eric even goes so far as to disrespect the mighty search engine, describing search engine advertising as "misdirection". Heresy! You mean that search engine optimization is an industry with no future? Search has been the one big success story in internet advertising - really the only business to make any money.

 

If advertising is getting less and less effective, companies will be forced to face a reality. Not a new reality, but one that has been neatly - if rather inefficiently - bypassed by resorting to comfortable historical choices. Advertising's decline in efficiency drives the relative efficiency of word of mouth, already a source of major advantage for leading firms significantly higher.

 

We already knew this. Companies like Amazon, Zappos and Starbucks - even Google ironically - grew primarily through word of mouth. Stories of meteoric internet success were usually stories of word of mouth, not examples of companies propelling themselves to success though superbowl advertising (the inverse was usually true). But the status quo persisted. It's easy to point to change aversion, career skills protection as the root cause. But the real change of course was the internet finally giving voice to customers as both an accelerant to great businesses and a compelling alternative to company brand messaging. You no longer own your brand. Your customers own your brand and they are exercising their ownership in full view.

 

Now some interesting outcomes connect NPS with firms’ word of mouth efforts. NPS really represents word of mouth capacity.

 

Capacity (economics), the point of production at which a firm or industry's average (or "per-unit") costs begin to rise, usually because some factor is fixed (often capital or land).

 

Exceed your word of mouth capacity as a business, and your growth needs to be driven by less efficient models - mainly advertising. It's hard to quantify this effect, but the extremes are easy to understand. A business with an NPS of zero has zero word of mouth capacity. The only way it can generate demand is through traditional advertising methods - that represents a very significant P&L disadvantage relative to competitors in its industry with higher NPS. We know that loyalty leaders - in a specific industry - have lower costs and this is one of the sources of that competitive advantage. A company with an NPS of 70% has such a significant capacity that - if they can mobilize it - they won't need advertising at all. Hence, Amazon.

 

But relative advantage in an industry is not the entire story. We know that some industries are characterized by low NPS - even amongst the best firms. Industries with low NPS winners are likely to be at a profitability disadvantage relative to firms who are competing in industries with high NPS. We would expect high margin industries to have high NPS on average.

 

There is also a strong argument to be made that higher nominal NPS has a disproportionate effect on word of mouth and demand generation efficiency. In other words, efficiency is not a linear progression as NPS rises. This fits with our intuitive sense of hyper growth associated with NPS leaders.

 

What drives this nonlinearity? One factor seems to be that promoters in high NPS companies seem to actually advocate for that brand more than promoters in low NPS companies. Vince Nowinski has some data to support this; check out his whitepaper. Why might that be the case? In part it could be social - people enjoy promoting products amongst other positive promoters. The opposite effect could hold true. If you had a great experience with a firm, but everyone around you is negative, you may choose not to advocate, as your sense of personal risk has just gone up. If misery loves company, apparently advocacy does as well.

 

Oh and remember that traditional advertising industry? Well, it turns out that the efficiency of traditional advertising may, in fact, be tied to NPS. High NPS companies actually get a lift because their advertising message is more likely to be received by promoters, of whom there are more. Once again, this makes intuitive sense. If you are positively predisposed to a brand, you are more likely to be receptive to that brand's message.

 

Will firms embrace this shift? Necessity is the mother of invention. Either firms evolve, or new entrants will finish them off with a superior, high NPS business model. There seems a lot of that going around right now.

0

Most of the best source material for case studies and best practices comes direct from firms who are implementing net promoter programs. As you might imagine, we get quite a lot of material from the conferences and net promoter.com

 

But for an executive audience, one of the best events has proven to be the Bain Loyalty Forum - a roundtable of senior execs with a common NPS mission. My notes on Verizon and Logitech both came from these meetings, but these events provide a pretty in-depth view into best practice as well as building a senior network to draw on. Several folk had requested information about this, so your best bet is to contact Stu Berman at stu.berman@bain.com for information.

 

See you there.

0

It’s often the conclusion amongst product companies – and Silicon Valley companies doubly so – that Net Promoter is a soft science that engineers don’t align with. So it was pretty interesting to see Logitech use NPS as a significant part of their product development and improvement culture. Take heed product – centric companies, these guys know how to make this work.

 

logitech.jpg Logitech is the $2+bn company whose products are right in front of you every day. I’m typing on a Logitech keyboard but it was the mouse that roared for Logitech – they dominate the computer mouse market and split hairs around segmentation. I counted 30 mice on their website alone, and that doesn’t include OEM product. Perhaps less well known are their totally cool products around home audio and video under the Harmony and Squeezebox brands – of which my home is littered. A strategy of selective technology acquisition has broadened the product line and reach of the company and, notwithstanding the recent bumps we are all feeling – has resulted in a story of near unmitigated success.

 

From an NPS standpoint, two approaches stood out for me. First, they look at product line NPS and can stack rank the performance of their products. This has the benefit, especially in the mouse line, of being able to quickly identify which products are gaining market acceptance and which are not connecting with customers (excuse the subtle pun). Engineers and product managers responsible for lower performing products move quickly to identify root cause, but the ultimate action might be to cut the product completely.


The second innovation for them was the creation of a customer experience gate through which any new product release must pass. Before any product goes out to market the customer experience team must sign off on it, with prior NPS root cause data as a good basis for predicting its acceptance. And of course, they have blocked product from launch in the past as a proof point that they take the process seriously.

 

Seeing products through a promoter creation lens helps engineers think differently about creating the best possible overall experience. The company has invested in software technology for their webcam products as they realized that, to create a great webcam experience, you needed to have more than just a good hardware device. Logitech has learnt those lessons quicker than most now they are in close dialog with their customers.

1 2 3 4 5 ... 7 Previous Next